New Labour's doppelte Kehrtwende: Anmerkungen zu Stuart Hall und eine alternative Perspektiv zu New Labour. by Jessop, Bob
Comments on ‘New Labour’s Double-Shuffle’
Bob Jessop

Stuart Hall offers yet another of his well-known bravura diagnoses in this recent critique of New Labour. He argues that its essential character can be understood in Gramscian terms as a dynamic transformist expression of neoliberalism with a social democratic face. Like his earlier analyses of Thatcherism and New Labour, however, his analysis is stronger on critical discourse analysis and his own political rhetoric than it is on its grasp of political economy and its implications for political practice. Indeed it would be interesting to subject this text itself to a critical discourse analysis to demonstrate the theoretical lacunae and the conceptual slippages in its powerful, persuasive, but ultimately flawed, exploration of this latest transformist project. I will focus on six issues raised by Hall’s text and then offer an alternative analysis rooted in a regulation- and state-theoretical political economy.

A Critique of Hall

First, Hall operates both with superficial analyses of the political scene as a series of points when unconstrained choices can be made and with more detailed analyses of the political scene considered as a ‘current conjuncture’ characterized by a dialectic of path-dependency and path-shaping. Thus the paper begins with the bold claim that ‘the Labour election victory in 1997 took place at a moment of great political opportunity … [that presented] a fundamental choice of directions for the incoming government’ (Hall 2004: 1). This suggests that the election was a distinctive moment of unconstrained choice and, if so, this would suggest a voluntarist and decisionist approach. This is clearly inconsistent with Hall’s more general analyses here and elsewhere. It also invokes a mythical “Left” that was capable in 1997 of pursuing a transitional programme committed to popular, radical policies but that was betrayed by New Labour’s ‘strategic choices’ as soon as it took office. But Hall also notes in the same paragraph that a mere rotation of the electoral wheel of fortune would be unlikely to produce the conditions for such a popular, radical programme. Indeed he soon goes on to argue that ‘New Labour has adapted the fundamental neo-liberal programme to suit its conditions of governance – that of a social democratic government trying to govern in a neo-liberal direction, while maintaining its traditional working class and public-sector middle class support, with all the compromises and confusions that entails’ (Hall 2004: 1). At the end of his article, however, Hall once again posits a decisive period of choice. He argues that the ‘Left’ has two years to prepare for a popular, radical transitional programme before the next election, which is another opportunity for the electoral pendulum to swing. Fortunately, this period is just enough time to construct an alternative political project for/from a range of Left forces operating within and beyond the Labour Party. Thus it seems that the implausible rhetorical introduction, belied by the intervening analysis, is necessary to enable another rhetorical flourish in his concluding remarks. 

Second, in line with his earlier analyses, Hall continues to neglect political economy. He does make a quick and necessary concession on the first page of his article that his early analyses had ignored the fundamental shifts in global political economy in that preceded Thatcherism and were reinforced by it. Interestingly, in this article, he presents these shifts in relatively passive terms as a ‘sea-change that overtook the world in the 1970s’. They comprise ‘the emerging new post-industrial society, the struggle by capital to restore its “right to manage”, the “globalization” of the international economy, the technological revolution, the rise of new individualism, the hegemony of neo-liberal free-market ideas’ (Hall 2004: 1). This tendency to naturalization and nominalization is also characteristic of neo-liberalism and, indeed, New Labour itself (cf. Fairclough 2000). Having made this brief concession, Hall reverts to a primarily ideological-cum-discursive analysis of New Labour and, to the extent that it re-emerges, political economy figures largely in the form of managerial values and practices rather than structural forms, institutions, and dynamics. This is consistent with Hall’s recent confession that he is ‘not interested in capitalism as such … [but in] why capitalism was like that in the 1960s -- or is like that in the 1990s -- and why these moments have to be understood as an overdetermination of cultural and political and other factors’ (1997: 28). This is reflected in Hall’s tendency to argue that, following the consolidation of Thatcherite neo-liberal reforms, the economy can be left to manage itself while New Labour focuses on modernization of the state and civil society. Not only does this ignore the continuing pro-active work undertaken by New Labour to create the economic as well as extra-economic conditions for a ‘globalizing knowledge-based economy’ but it also tends to reproduce the liberal assumption that the market economy is able to reproduce itself. Such an assumption was certainly not shared by Marx or Gramsci and is also criticized by Foucault and the anglo-Foucauldians who now find favour in Hall’s account on governmentality and the production of self-managing (social) entrepreneurial subjects.

Third, this problem is reflected in Hall’s failure to offer any serious economic contextualization of the postwar dynamic of the welfare state. He argues that Labour’s greatest achievement was the creation of the welfare state; Thatcherism then savaged and weakened it; and New Labour embarked on its wholesale deconstruction. Such an account ignores the pre-history of the welfare state in economic transformations and war-time economic, political, and social experiences, the more general tendency rooted in the logic of Atlantic Fordism that produced different variants of the Keynesian welfare national state in advanced capitalist economies, Labour’s own initial steps in the weakening of the welfare state before the first Thatcher government, the contradictions in New Labour policy towards the welfare state and the politics of redistribution to complement and flank the adverse economic and social consequences of neo-liberalism, and so on. Here too political rhetoric triumphs over rigorous political economy – which is all the more surprising given Hall’s earlier analyses of the postwar settlement, the periodization of its crisis, and his nuanced analyses of different stages in the rise and consolidation of Thatcherism (e.g., Hall et al., 1978). It is also inconsistent with his own distinction in the present article between the first and second New Labour governments – with New Labour using its second term to promote public sector delivery and redistribution to counteract the growing disillusion of its ‘heartland’ supporters and to address the economic and social consequences of neo-liberal market failure and economic polarization.

Fourth, in seeking to explain the transformations that have occurred in Britain over the past quarter century, Hall operates with three apparently inconsistent sets of arguments. 
(1) He continues to exaggerate the hegemony of Thatcherism and the role of Thatcherite hegemony in effecting the epochal economic and political shift that occurred during the Thatcher years. In this respect he continues to underplay the resort to force, fraud, and corruption, the capacity to rotate minorities, the strategic errors and internal disorganization of the labour movement, the underlying structural transformations, and more general reliance on the economic-corporate rather than expansive hegemony in consolidating Thatcherism (see Jessop 2002). Yet he also recognizes that there was a major reaction against the ‘brutalism’ of Thatcherism and, indeed, it was this reaction that created the historic opening offered by the 1997 election. That this historic opening was not seized is then explained, however, in terms of more fundamental structural changes that exert a powerful institutional legacy independently of changes in the political scene or the purely conjunctural balance of forces (cf. Jessop et al 1990). 
(2) Hall then contrasts the ‘broad hegemony’ of the Thatcherite neo-liberal project and its deep philosophical foundations with the self-evident (to him) shallowness of New Labour’s ideological project. He deploys a formidable array of pejorative terms to describe New Labour’s presentation of its project: revisionism, gobble-de-gook, spin, waffle, double-talk, shameless evasions, economy with the truth, endless manipulation, bad faith, scams and devices, crafty incremental strategy, jargon, boring repetition of the language of ‘choice’, speaking with a forked tongue, sleight-of-hand, self-fulfilling declarations of the obsolescence of the public interest and public good, and so forth. Whereas Thatcherism established an enduring consensus around a neo-liberal common sense (except when it did not), New Labour has merely generated political apathy and cynicism. At the same time, however, the general public seems to have ‘swallowed managerialist discourse whole’ and new forms of government, governance, and governmentality are transforming everyone ‘slowly but surely’ into self-managing social entrepreneurs enabling the privatization of social need. This sounds suspiciously like an extended neo-liberal common sense based on an authentic hegemonic project. 
(3) It is in this context that Hall also argues that New Labour is pursuing a pragmatic long-term transformist project with an inflexible, market fundamentalist ideological baseline that commits it to entrepreneurial values, wealth creation, efficiency, choice, selectivity, reform and modernization. This project expresses the dominant neo-liberal strategy inherited seamlessly from Thatcherism and is now sustained by subaltern social democracy. This asymmetrical combination of neo-liberalism with social democracy is necessitated by Labour’s distinctive social and electoral base and the resulting political imperative to win enough consent to keep its hold on power in an authentically hegemonic strategy. Nonetheless it is sufficiently fragile (despite the slow but sure re-subjectification of everyone into self-managing entrepreneurs to give the Left just enough time to prepare an authentic counter-hegemonic strategy. 

Hall attempts to reconcile these different positions by referring to New Labour’s ‘double-headed strategy’. He claims that neo-liberalism is dominant and that social democratic discourse and practices are subaltern. In this context, spin plays an essential role in mediating and mystifying this relation by highlighting social democratic discourse and material concessions at the expense of the more fundamental development and dynamic of neo-liberalism. And he also argues that social democracy is being continually redefined as its meaning slides in response to the latest incremental shift in the neo-liberal ratchet. That social democracy still plays a role, however subaltern and however slippery, is then explained in terms of the political imperative for a social democratic party to balance the realities of power with electoral logic (cf. Gamble 1974). 





Just as in my earlier debates with Stuart Hall on Thatcherism (Jessop 1984; Jessop et al., 1988; Jessop et al., 1990), there are many areas of agreement as well as major areas of disagreement in our current diagnoses of Blairism. I also see New Labour as a variant of neo-liberalism – but one with a christian socialist rather than a social democratic face. Moreover, while Hall sees Blair adapting Thatcherism to the traditional social bases of the labour movement, I see it as introducing flanking and supporting measures to consolidate and maintain the momentum of neo-liberalism following its only partly successful stabilization under the post-Thatcher Government led by the new Conservative Prime Minister, John Major – a period that has been described as ‘Thatcherism with a grey face’ (1992-1997). This alternative interpretation is based on a stronger appreciation than Hall acknowledges of the continuing constraints involved in Britain’s flawed transition from a flawed Fordism to post-Fordism, notably its current face as a globalizing, ‘knowledge-based economy’. 

Consolidated Thatcherism combined a distinctive 'two nations' authoritarian populist hegemonic project, a centralizing 'strong state' project, and a neo-liberal accumulation strategy. We must distinguish these three aspects not only because they developed unevenly in the Thatcher-Major years; but also, and more importantly for our purposes, because the so-called 'break' with Thatcherism initiated by New Labour's Third Way affects Thatcherism’s hegemonic more than its state project and also leaves its neo-liberal accumulation strategy more or less intact. For, while New Labour retains an authoritarian populist approach in many areas, it has clearly moved towards a more socially inclusive hegemonic project and a more decentralizing state project at the same time as it continues to pursue the neo-liberal accumulation strategy. Its concern with social inclusion responds to the limitations of the possessive individualism favoured by neo-liberalism and recognizes the need to re-embed market forces into a broader, more cohesive social order. It aims to remoralize the neo-liberal accumulation strategy around a populist 'one nation' hegemonic project that will reduce social exclusion without undermining the economic well-being of 'Middle England', whose members delivered Blair two general election victories (in 1997 and 2001) despite a loss of support in Old Labour's heartlands. This project clearly reflects Blair's strong Christian socialist leanings and marked antipathy to collectivism and corporatism.​[1]​ Thus New Labour aims to secure social inclusion primarily through labour market attachment and the economic regeneration of marginalized communities; and individual, family, and child poverty are to be alleviated mainly by a series of 'stealthy' (rather than proudly proclaimed) redistributive measures that ideally involve redirecting revenues within what would still remain rigid fisco-financial parameters. In this sense, emphasis on communitarian themes and policies is still little more than a flanking measure to ameliorate the effects of a neo-liberal accumulation strategy. 

The core elements of consolidated Thatcherism's neo-liberal accumulation strategy comprised: (a) liberalization, promoting free market (as opposed to monopolistic or state monopolistic) forms of competition as the most efficient basis for market forces; (b) deregulation, giving economic agents greater freedom from state control and legal restrictions; (c) privatization, reducing the public sector's share in the direct or indirect provision of goods and services to business and community alike; (d) (re-) commodification of the residual public sector, to promote the role of market forces, either directly or through market proxies; (e) internationalization, encouraging the mobility of capital and labour, stimulating global market forces, and importing more advanced processes and products into Britain as a means of economic modernization; and (f) reduced direct taxes to expand the scope for the operation of market forces through enhanced investor and consumer choice. 

These policies formed the micro-economic supply-side complement to Thatcherism’s macro-economic austerity strategy. They have also shaped the broader structural and strategic shift from a flawed Atlantic Fordism and Keynesian Welfare National State towards an ill-defined post-Fordist mode of growth and half-hearted Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regime (Jessop 1998). The path beyond the post-war Fordist mode of growth was mainly viewed during the Thatcher-Major period in terms of a shift from industrialism to post-industrialism, flexibility rather than rigidity in the social relations of production, and an increased role for small and medium firms in job creation. This approach was believed to require state action to promote enterprise, innovation, and competitiveness, to subordinate a broad range of social policies to the demands of greater labour market flexibility, and to lower overall social expenditure qua cost of international production. New Labour has continued along this path. More recently the British power bloc has embraced the concept of the globalizing, knowledge-based economy as the key to a successful transition to post-Fordism. New Labour has signed up to this new approach too.

It is tempting to attribute New Labour's electoral victory in 1997 to a cunning combination of 'an organizational fix and floating signifiers'. For its organizational reforms enabled the leadership to distance New Labour from its past and to assert control over its future; and its resort to soundbites and malleable 'big ideas' enabled it to leave its strategic line and detailed political programme undefined as far as the electorate was concerned. Following its election, the New Labour government seems to have been content, at a minimum, to administer much of Thatcherism's legacy in regard to the six main planks of neo-liberalism, as if considering their effects to date as so many economically or politically irreversible faits accomplis. It also committed itself to further liberalization and de-regulation in many areas; to the privatization or, at least, corporatization,​[2]​ of most of what remains of the state-owned sector; and to the extension of market forces into what remains of the public and social services at national, regional, and local level as well as to the spread of market forces into the provision of such services elsewhere in Europe and the rest of the world. Its policy on this last point reflects its firm attachment to the internationalization of the British economy, as evidenced in its welcome to inward investment, its active promotion of the international interests of British-based (but not always British-owned) financial, commercial, and industrial capital, and its support for the Washington Consensus on the benefits of free trade in services on a world scale. Indeed, New Labour has warmly embraced the logic of neo-liberal globalization as a whole, proudly proclaiming to all and sundry at home and abroad its inevitability, desirability, and truly global benefits. This is reflected in its hostility to more corporatist and/or statist approaches to post-Fordist economic strategy and the European social model in the European Union. Finally, New Labour under Blair also accepted the income tax rates and spending plans of the last Conservative government as the basis for its own first period of office not just for prudential electoral reasons but also on more principled grounds, re-affirming during the 2001 election campaign (and more recently still) its commitment to maintaining or reducing the current top rate of income tax. This is why New Labour has prioritized attempts to reduce unemployment in order to cut the social assistance bill and to raise tax revenues, to discover areas where cuts can be made to free resources for its social agenda, and to introduce social policies that would make a difference at little or no cost (Blair 1996). 

These continuities should not blind us to modifications in the neo-liberal project as compared to the Thatcher and Major years. Neo-liberalism is an evolving economic and political project that has already passed through several stages, can be adjusted as its effects unfold in different fields and on different scales, and has to be adapted to changing economic, political, and social circumstances. In particular, as the neo-liberal regime shift comes to be consolidated, significant changes in the state's role occur. The transition period was marked by a concern with rolling back the exceptional forms of state intervention linked to attempts at crisis-management in the previous regime (Atlantic Fordism) as well as the more normal forms of intervention associated with the Keynesian Welfare National State; and by a concern with rolling forward the institutional architecture for a new regime, securing the balance of forces needed for this, and establishing the new forms of state intervention deemed appropriate to that regime should it be successfully consolidated. More recently, while the rolling forward process continues (especially in relation to the knowledge-based economy), we can also see the first steps towards a routinization of neo-liberalism. More emphasis has been given to securing the operation of the emerging neo-liberal regime through normal politics, to developing supporting policies across a wide range of policy fields, and to providing flanking mechanisms to compensate for its negative economic, political, and social consequences. For example, New Labour's social strategy reflects not only the continuing desire to subordinate social policy to the alleged economic imperatives of global competition but also to address the marked increase in social polarization and exclusion that has accompanied the neo-liberal project as pursued by the Thatcher-Major governments. This is especially important given the markedly uneven development of the British economy during the Thatcher-Major years -- with overheating in London and the South more generally and, in the North, de-industrialization and relative economic stagnation. These measures were nonetheless limited by cost constraints in the first two to three years of the New Labour government and by worries that they might create political space for opposition to the New Labour project. Initially more impressive in their rhetoric, aims, and institutional design than they in their often niggardly and mean-spirited implementation, therefore, they have recently become the centrepiece of the second New Labour government as it prepares for the next general election.The neo-liberal imperative behind these measures is reinforced by continuing political worries about state unity and territorial unity, political legitimacy, and the prospects for New Labour’s re-election in 2005 as well as by more general concerns with the future of social cohesion. The recent popular dissatisfaction after the occupation of Iraq and the European and local elections (June 2004) have strengthened these contradictions between pressing ahead with neo-liberalism and winning back popular support through policy initiatives that go beyond flanking and supporting measures compatible with it.

The impression of neo-liberal primacy in New Labour is evident not only in the general strategic line in the many policy shifts undertaken by Blair before the 1997 election and subsequently but also in the constancy and conviction that has marked the pursuit of neo-liberalism both rhetorically and practically compared to the general oscillation and hesitation in those aspects of New Labour discourse and actions that seem to run counter to neo-liberalism.​[3]​ Moreover, whilst it toughs out opposition from party members, trade unions, new social movements, and even allegedly ‘short-term’ electoral unpopularity, New Labour has always proved highly sensitive to business criticism about its alleged neglect and/or backsliding regarding the market mechanism. Business is also over-represented in scores of official review and advisory bodies and is being given an increasing role in the creeping privatization of public and social services. Initially this could have been dismissed as a pragmatic desire to win the trust of business on the grounds that this would make it electable and help to secure a period of economic stability and growth that would provide the resources to reform the welfare state. But it now appears that New Labour has embraced the City agenda and neo-liberalism more generally and pays less attention even to regional chambers of the CBI, Chambers of Commerce, and other representatives of the domestic economy, let alone the trade unions. 

New Labour has followed willingly in the footsteps of Thatcherism in promoting a shift from a Keynesian welfare national state to a Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime. Having pioneered Keynesian demand management under Attlee, the Labour Party under Blair now advocates full employability achieved through micro-government rather than full employment achieved through macro-economic management; and, having set up the post-war welfare state, it now sees welfare dependency and welfare statism as problems to be eliminated through a mandatory neo-liberal programme of workfarism and the introduction of market forces and business practices into delivery of income support and public services. In both respects it has embraced the general neo-liberal strategic line developed during the Thatcher-Major years and, in particular, the increasingly hard 'welfare-to-work' programme that has been developed in the USA under the Reagan, Bush senior, Clinton, and Bush junior presidencies. Blair’s ability to switch from a Clintonite ‘Third Way’ strategy to the neo-conservative strategic line of George W. Bush indicates his basic support for a transatlantic neo-liberalism. In line with this, New Labour has intensified the strategy it inherited of promoting workfare and putting systematic downward pressure on public spending on universal welfare benefits – most notably in pensions, housing provision, long-term disability insurance, long-term health care, and higher education – as well as making welfare benefits more selective (or ‘targeted’ in the jargon of neo-liberalism). However, whereas the Conservatives would have used the savings generated by these measures to cut taxes, New Labour is attempting to use them to effect a longer-term and covert redistribution of welfare spending to the very poor through carefully-targeted means-tested benefits. This is intended to limit the most serious forms and effects of social exclusion – to promote both economic efficiency and social justice – without upsetting the crucial swing voters of Middle England. 

While New Labour proclaims its commitment to innovation and the knowledge-based economy, it rejects – like its Conservative predecessors – the levels of taxation and public expenditure needed to pursue a consistent Schumpeterian strategy. Instead it is more inclined towards a neo-Ricardian strategy, i.e., one that is oriented to weak competition based on deregulating enterprise and reducing relative unit labour costs in the interests of allocative efficiency rather than one that is oriented to greater dynamic efficiency based on developing strong competition around enhanced structural or systemic competitiveness. It is nonetheless obvious that New Labour is committed to a workfare strategy in which social policy is subordinated to the twin requirements of labour market flexibility and of maintaining downward pressure on the social wage qua cost of international production. This inflects workfarism in a neo-liberal rather than neo-corporatist or neo-statist manner and is therefore more likely to promote ‘flexploitation’ than ‘flexicurity’. The former term usefully refers to ‘the anti-worker aspects of flexibility’ (Gray 1998: 3). The latter term, although anglophone, was coined by the Dutch in 1995 to refer to the rebalancing (through neo-corporatist bargaining and social pacts) of increased labour market flexibilization on the one hand and social and employment security on the other. In contrast to the preceding Conservative governments, however, New Labour’s approach to workfare is more a 'One Nation' inclusionary than a 'Two Nations' exclusionary strategy. This shift in approach has a dual motivation. Not only does New Labour believe in an American-style 'welfare-to-work' strategy that uses welfare as a springboard into the labour market rather than as a safety net for the unemployed – it also hopes that this will gradually reduce public expenditure, releasing funds for other social priorities including education, health and alleviating child poverty. 

The post-national character of New Labour's strategy is ambiguous. On the one hand, there is a clear commitment to devolution (witness the Welsh and Scottish Assemblies, plans for regional assemblies in England, and, beginning with London, the introduction of city mayors). And, albeit more for political than economic motives, New Labour also has a more pro-European stance to put alongside the pro-Americanism or pro-Atlanticism it has inherited from the Thatcher/Major years. But this pro-EU stance is more concerned with the creation of a single market that might benefit UK-based (if not always British-owned) international financial and service firms than it is with developing a strong social Europe or a federal European state. This is clear from Blair’s defense of his “red lines” in the recently concluded negotiations over the new EU constitutional settlement. New Labour supports a strong European approach to the single market, security issues, the environment, and labour immigration; but it opposes a uniform European approach to labour markets, trade unionism, social welfare, and social inclusion. Its decision to delay participation in the single European currency system also suggests continuing caution about the European project. In this sense there is more rhetoric than reality behind New Labour’s commitment to give Britain a leading role in Europe.  
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^1	  Gordon Brown, the Chancellor and Blair’s rival, shares the latter's ethical socialism and commitment to the work ethic but, as can be seen from his expensive programme of redistribution by stealth, is less hostile to an active role for the state. But he also shows a passionate and unfathomable support for the Private Finance Initiative, an expensive means of purchasing capital goods on annual rental from profit-making enterprises.
^2	  Corporatization refers to the transformation of publicly accountable state-owned enterprises into corporate entities operating according to commercial criteria and protected by a cloak of commercial confidentiality, even if they continue to receive state funding.
^3	  At different times New Labour has invoked 'the stakeholding society', 'the giving society', 'communitarianism', 'social citizenship', 'social capital', 'partnership', and, of course, 'the Third Way' to distinguish its approach from Thatcherite neo-liberalism. But these are rarely followed through practically in case they threaten the neo-liberal project. Instead New Labour has proceeded to implement its social programme through 'stealth' rather than by mobilizing the socially excluded behind a radical hegemonic project. On New Labour discourse more generally, see Fairclough (2000).
